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Abstract 
 
This thesis does two main things. It contributes to the academic debate on the relative 
prominence of the cyber domain in security, and analyses the change in NATO’s 
conceptualization of “cyber” over time. These pertinent questions are addressed through 
quantitative and qualitative analyses. The review of existing scholarship on the topic provides 
insight into NATO’s strategic development, major cyber-security incidents, the issues relating 
to Article 5 of the NATO treaty and cyber security, and the effects on the security environment 
that stems from technological developments in society. By employing the approach of 
constructivism, the framework of strategic culture, and methods of content analysis, this thesis 
tracks the change in prominence and conceptualization in official NATO documents from 2002-
2016. As a result, this thesis contributes to an understanding of digital-age security from the 
point of view of NATO. Finally, it suggests that an awareness of one’s own strategic culture 
can aid in preparing for new challenges in a security-oriented environment.  
 
 
Keywords: International Security, Cyber Security, NATO, Constructivism, Content 
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“The brain carries the memory of yesterday, which is tradition, and is frightened to let 
go, because it cannot face something new. Tradition becomes our security, and when the mind 
is secure it is in decay.” Jiddu Krishnamurti, 1969 
Introduction  
 
NATO, Cyber Security, and a rapidly changing security environment 
 
At the Cyber Conference in Tallinn, Estonia in June 2016, North Atlantic Treaty Association 
(NATO) high officials discussed the idea of implementing cyberspace as the fifth domain of 
warfare as an expected outcome of the July 2016 Warsaw summit. Implications of this would 
necessarily include both a re-thinking of cyber defence for NATO, and an update of the 5th 
article of the Washington Treaty regarding its collective defence component. Recent 
developments have confirmed the agreement to recognize cyber as a domain at the Warsaw 
summit1, which means that in the future, cyber-attacks could be treated the same as military 
attacks; any attack on one is an attack on all member countries, and must be responded to 
accordingly. 
Rapid technological developments and an on-going process of further interconnecting 
the digital environment with society have spurred a whole range of new security challenges that 
link cyber security and societal developments together (Granville 2003). The information 
revolution refers to the changes as a result of a transition from the mechanical to the digital in 
societies. The proof is found in its impact on economic, social, and technological progress in a 
post-industrial society (Castell 2010). The information revolution is central to the topic of cyber 
security, cyber warfare, and cyber terrorism (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997), as it has facilitated 
advancements in how critical infrastructures, economic sectors, and communications take 
place. Moreover, the most technically developed countries experience a disproportionate 
relation between publicly and privately owned business, and the subsequent problem of 
diffusion when it comes to whose responsibility it is to attend to the security of societal critical 
infrastructure (Herrington and Aldrich 2013). At the same time, the development of capabilities 
in cyber-space is increasingly more diverse and complex in its manifestations (Choucri 2012: 
125-126). Cyber-war in a modern technological age intensifies developments in warfare that 
                                                     
1 See article at http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_132356.htm?selectedLocale=en 
2 
 
alter the centrality of the state as a security actor, as previously introduced by guerrilla war and 
terrorism. Non-state actors such as individuals and organizations are becoming increasingly 
relevant (Sigholm 2013). Additionally, surveillance, propaganda, and espionage have found 
new life through digital means (Singer and Friedman 2014: 91-92). With the examples of 
Tallinn in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and the current conflict in Ukraine, new hybrid approaches 
have quickly taken centre-stage in debates about the future of warfare 2. 
However, much of the scholarly debate surrounding cyber security and cyber warfare 
centres around definitional problems of what “cyber” is (Singer and Friedman 2014: 12-66), 
the potency of cyber warfare (McGraw 2013; Junio 2013), whether a cyber war will or will not 
take place (Stone 2013; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993; Rid 2012), the role of the cyber component 
in military organizations (Eom 2012), the extent to which critical infrastructures are endangered 
by the digitalization of societies (Granville 2003; Herrington and Aldrich 2013; Klimburg 2012: 
36-39), and definitional or legal problems regarding cyber-attacks, attribution of attacks (Rid 
and Buchanan 2015), and “acts of war” (Hughes 2010; Roscini 2014). There has been a lack of 
independent research on defence organizations like NATO and their stance on and 
interpretation of the prominence and conceptualization of cyber and security3. One theoretical 
approach that specifically focuses on conceptualization of events from the perspective of actors 
is social constructivism.  
A constructivist approach to research that engages with the digital sphere allows for 
investigation of identity based perspectives and framing, and can through quantitative methods 
reveal patterns of meaning in large bodies of text (Eriksson and Giacomello 2014: 206). This 
approach has formed the backbone of work analysing the construction of threats within political 
discourse (Eriksson and Giacomello 2007; Dunn Cavelty 2008; Deibert 2013). Klotz and Lynch 
(2007) suggest content analysis as a means to analyse the large amounts of text available in the 
digital age. Employing a constructivist approach focused on language and the meaning behind 
rhetoric, serves as a means to discovering patterns or trends that relate to ideas and identity 
(Eriksson and Giacomello 2014: 209). A constructivist approach combined with the content 
analysis method allows for a study of the political communications and culture of NATO (ibid.). 
Strategic culture theory contends that ideas and beliefs within a dominant culture, or milieu, 
within an organization, shapes the way in which the organization perceives the world, and the 
                                                     
22 See Grant (2008) on Hybrid Warfare at  
http://www.govexec.com/magazine/features/2008/05/hybrid-wars/26799/ 
3 See Fidler, David, Pregent, Richard, and Vandurme, Alex (2013) “NATO, Cyber Defense, and International Law” 
for one of the few examples of the type of research that is done on the topic. 
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extent to which it is willing to change or adapt to new problems. Strategic culture is further 
discussed in the methodology and framework section, and guides this thesis towards a 
generation of testable hypotheses. 
 
Thesis aims and structure 
 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to two debates on cyber security. Firstly, how prominent 
is cyber security in NATO’s official documents? This will take place in the form of a 
quantitative content analysis. Secondly, this thesis examines the way in which NATO’s 
(outwards) understanding of “cyber” has changed over time. This examination follows a coding 
process of key words and associations of official NATO documents. Both content analyses are 
performed on a body of official NATO documents in a time period from 2002 to 2016, not 
including the coming 2016 Warsaw summit. The Prague summit in 2002 is the first summit 
where the word “cyber” is specifically mentioned, and serves as a logical point of departure. 
Due to the deadline of this thesis, the timeframe stops at Secretary General Stoltenberg’s April 
speech in 2016. The research questions guiding this thesis are the following, “how has NATO’s 
perception of the prominence of cyber security changed from 2002-2016”, and, “how has 
NATO’s conceptualization of ‘cyber’ changed in the same timeframe?” 
 
This thesis sets out by accounting for the chosen methodology and framework in the 
first section. The second section provides an overview of existing scholarship on NATO and 
cyber security. The following section is twofold; first, it discusses the findings of the 
quantitative content analysis. Second, it presents results from the qualitative content analysis. 
The aim of this section is to evaluate the claims of the research questions and hypotheses that 
guides this research. The thesis concludes by stressing the implications of the research. 
 
 
Methodology and Framework 
 
4 
 
This section presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. The framework forms the basis of 
hypothesis generation by discussing constructivism as an approach, and strategic culture as the 
applied theoretical framework. 
 
Constructivism and Cyber Security 
 
A defined theoretical framework allows for the construction of conceptually informed 
hypotheses regarding the research questions. Additionally, it helps in guiding research and 
placing its consequential findings within a theoretical frame. The choice of theoretical 
framework in this thesis is guided by The Information Revolution (Eriksson and Giacomello 
2006) and Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations (Klotz and Lynch 
2007), in which constructivism is argued to be best suited to deal with security issues related to 
recent developments in society; the information revolution and the interconnectedness that 
follows security in the digital age (Eriksson and Giacomello 2006). While realism and 
liberalism offer valuable angles on security, both fall short when examining the intricacies of 
cyberspace and security. Realism, while primarily concerned with security, suffers from an 
overly state-centric perspective (Reardon and Choucri 2012: 5). This focus limits the questions 
one would ask about the impact of “cyber”, as well as the methods of study, as it fails to account 
for the increasing relevance of non-state actors, and adheres to a more rigorous positivist 
ontology. Liberalists on the other hand, have not engaged with the topic of cyber security (ibid: 
6). This may be the result of liberalist scholars’ emphasis on cooperation, development, and the 
spread of ideas, rather than the security aspects of cyberspace (ibid.). Since constructivism 
contends that beliefs shape identities, which in turn shape interests (Eriksson and Giacomello 
2006: 233; Katzenstein 1996; Eriksson and Giacomello 2014: 2006), the constructivist 
approach helps explain the developments of NATO and cyber security from an ideational point 
of view: change in interests comes from a shift in identities and norms (ibid). Furthermore, 
since constructivists “emphasize (…) [the] significance of interpretation (…) [and how] 
perceptions of reality are always “filtered” and shaped by particular values, identities and 
interests (…)” (Eriksson and Giacomello 2014: 206), it is suited for threat perception analysis. 
Implied when examining a shift in identities and norms, is an historical outlook that allows for 
the change to be studied in the given time period: 2002-2016. Since this thesis deals with how 
NATO perceives cyber and security, it is useful to employ threat perception examination 
through a constructivist lens that accounts for ideational factors. As a result, this research delves 
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into questions about NATO’s perceptions of the prominence and conceptualization of “cyber” 
over time. The theoretical framework emphasizes the interplay between interpretation of reality, 
identities, norms, and decision-making, and contributes as a versatile and strong toolbox in 
dealing with the research agenda.   
A Theoretical Framework of Identity and Strategic Culture 
 
Lantis (2002) provides key concepts for the research on NATO and its culture. Notably, the 
ideational foundations of security policy are accentuated as a product of political and strategic 
culture (ibid: 87-88, 106). Such a culture comes from history and geographical conditions (Gray 
2006: 10-11), and is found in interpretive codes of language and symbolism. It contains the set 
of beliefs, ideas, and values of individuals and collectives (ibid; Biava, Drent and Herd 2011: 
2.). Moreover, these codes encompass assumptions of the political world that determine which 
problems are identified, the way they are perceived, and the range of alternatives available to 
deal with them (Elkins and Simeon 1979: 127). Furthermore, Hudson (1997) argues that 
constructivism provides an understanding of culture as an ever-evolving system through shared 
meaning to the studies of security. This system governs perceptions, communications, and 
actions that become the output (practice) of foreign policy. Berger specifies political-military 
cultural interpretations as static and change-resistant. This because,  
 
“First, existing political culture is widely shared, so ‘alternative’ sets of ideas (…) enjoy 
little support (..) second, standard elements of strategic culture, especially the evaluative and 
affective components (…) [are] difficult to disconfirm. Third, (…) information that reinforces 
existing images and beliefs are readily assimilated, while inconsistent data tend to be ignored, 
rejected, or distorted” (1994:24-25).  
 
In other words, the dominant culture within a military organization resists alternative 
ideas and interpretations as a result of its own identity that is reproduced through action. 
Therefore, one would expect NATO’s development to tie to its interpretation to be inherently 
change-resistant. These actions are guided by historical and geographical conditions. Path-
dependent models of foreign policy shape the development of foreign policy in a long-term 
perspective (Banchoff 1999:1-2), and the concept of strategic culture, “particularly those 
concerning decisions to go to war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes 
of warfare, and levels of wartime casualties (..)” (ibid.).  
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Johnston (1995) outlines cultures as milieus that consist of shared assumptions, with an 
internal dominant culture of preserving the status quo. Elites are often the “purveyor of the 
common historical narrative” (Lantis 2002: 107); a narrative that shapes identities and beliefs 
over time. However, external shocks can fundamentally challenge existing beliefs by 
undermining historical narratives. An intense external shock that disables the culture to provide 
solutions or proper responses, can create internal doubt and space for alternatives. This can 
introduce changes both in a short and a long-term perspective (ibid: 106-112).   
In NATO’s case, the strategic culture would thus be primed to maintain its original goals 
of collective defence policies and deterrence. The dominant culture within the organization 
would be expected to resist change and new ideas, unless catalysts for change such as “dramatic 
events or traumatic experiences”, or external shocks serve fundamental challenges to existing 
beliefs and undermine historical narratives within the alliance. Therefore, one cannot expect 
significant alteration of ideas and identity outside of extraordinary incidents that shake the 
foundations of the set of beliefs of values of NATO, but rather a steady change over time with 
a spike in changing measures at critical junctures. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Based on the theoretical framework above, one would expect the following hypotheses to 
hold true: 
 
H1: The frequency in mentions of “cyber” in NATO official documents has increased in the 
time period 2002-2016. 
H2: Critical junctures in the period of 2007-2009 and in 2014 provides reason for higher 
frequency in mentions of “cyber”. 
H3: Once a critical juncture is reached, the milieu and operation of NATO is transformed and 
thus forced to reformulate “cyber” as a conspicuous security dimension. 
H4: The rapidly developing security environment has led to a richer association of the 
concept of “cyber” over time. 
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These hypotheses are tested through one quantitative and one qualitative content analysis as 
outlined below. 
 
Conceptual and Relational Content Analysis 
 
Conceptual content analysis is a research method that establishes the existence and frequency 
(prominence) of concepts by words or phrases in a text. In short, a conceptual content analysis 
looks for the presence of words in a given body of documents to measure its prominence, and 
can be performed over time, in relation to other words, or both (Palmquist, Carley, and Dale 
1997). This thesis employs conceptual content analysis to measure the relative prominence of 
“cyber” in NATO’s discourse through quantitative analysis in the time period 2002-2016. 
 
Relational content analysis goes beyond the identification of concepts in texts by exploring the 
relationships between the concepts identified. Furthermore, it allows for semantic analysis. The 
variant of relational analysis employed in this research is proximity analysis. Proximity analysis 
is concerned with interrelated, co-occuring concepts, and informs us about the overall meaning 
of the text. (Palmquist, Carley, and Dale 1997). In sum, relational content analysis allows us to 
infer characteristics of a communication by examining a concept’s associations in a text (Holsti 
1969). Relational content analysis forms the background of the examination of the change in 
NATO’s conceptualization of “cyber” from 2002-2016. 
 
Software and Approach 
 
The software used in executing these content analyses was R 3.3.1, by making use of the tm 
package, and the xpdf engine. In order to run a content analysis through R 3.3.1, the usage of 
the tm package is threefold: first, it provides functions for scanning the text(s). Secondly, it 
allows for converting the body of 21 documents into a corpus. Thirdly, the tm package’s readpdf 
function in combination with the xpdf engine allows for scanning the corpus for the data 
requested. Furthermore, there are two parameters for the xpdf engine: info, and text. The 
purpose of this is to maintain the original physical layout of the text as well as possible. The 
readpdf function reads the text. This is the first step, and allows the software read the text. The 
second step, is to clean the corpus with commands including conversions of all text to lower 
case, removal of white spaces, and removal of punctuation. This makes for more consistent 
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output when scanning the text. Finally, the r-script writes the findings into two different 
spreadsheet files (.csv). The first file, named “prominence”, presents word frequencies in 
columns based on the different key-words; cyber, new threats, regional stability + regional 
security + regional defence, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, biological + nuclear 
+ chemical weapons, Russia, and Article 5. The second file, named “paragraphs” prints a table 
that shows all paragraphs including the word “cyber”, the name of the document they are 
extracted from, and the line number of the document they are found.  
 The choice of keywords for the quantitative analysis was made through a random 
selection of five NATO-documents, with manual reading and coding by relevance to cyber 
security, and to frequency. The qualitative content analysis output is available in its entirety in 
appendix B.  
 
See appendix A for the r-script used in these analyses. 
 
Selecting a Corpus: Official Documents 
 
In applying content analysis to political communication, it is necessary to limit and justify one’s 
choice of sources. This research examines how NATO sees itself and the security environment. 
Therefore, the primary sources have to comprise of official NATO statements or documents. 
The primary sources of this thesis are the bi-annual summit declarations from NATO summits 
between 2002-2014. Moreover, to expand the body of documents of analysis, speeches by 
NATO secretary generals and official statements add to the quantity of the research, and 
stretches the timeline by additional two years to 2016. The choice of official documents follows 
Sowers’ (2009: 25) logic; if the goal is to see how NATO projects itself and therefore also how 
it sees itself in relation to a problem, or an “other”, official documents serve as excellent primary 
sources. This thesis assumes that NATO-published documents and statements are carefully 
drafted, and can uncover recurring themes and messages in their communication as a reflection 
of their self-image (ibid.). This body of documents allow for two things: Firstly, it enables a 
quantitative analysis that highlights the increasing prominence of “cyber” vis-à-vis other 
domains in NATO’s discourse. Secondly, it allows for a qualitative analysis that draws from 
data to infer about NATO’s conceptualization over time. 
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Limitations of Content Analysis 
 
The limitations of content analysis are first and foremost found in its descriptive nature. As the 
research can only produce data that allows for inferences, and not “hard facts”, it inherently 
limits the ability to generalize and solidify theory. However, content analysis is an unobtrusive, 
inexpensive, and easily replicable research method (McNamara 2003; Neuendorf 2002) 
Furthermore, it is an excellent tool for observing change over time. It allows for systematic 
coding and evaluation of the use of communication for each year of the time-period selected; 
through looking at context associated words. Its findings do not tell us about the underlying 
reasons for the phenomena observed, however it spurs a range of new questions and allows for 
fact and data-based reasoning. This research combines qualitative and quantitative approaches 
as a means to answer H1-H4 as well as derive new hypotheses from the findings.  
 
Existing Scholarship: NATO meets Cyber Security 
 
The Development of NATO and Cyber Security 
 
NATO’s main purpose during the Cold War was maintaining sufficient military strength to act 
as a deterring force, and to assure a ‘balance of forces’ by creating and maintaining stability 
and security (Yost 2010: 490). Since the end of the Cold War, NATO adopted further purposes 
by vowing to oppose proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), supporting EU-
led crisis management operations under the “Berlin-Plus” arrangements4, and assisting general 
ad-hoc security operations (ibid: 492). The notion of security was further broadened in 1999 
when The North Atlantic Council proclaimed that terrorism could affect the security interests 
of NATO, and in 2001 this was put to practice when Article 5 was invoked after 9/11 (Yost 
2010: 494). Article 5 proclaims that an armed attack against one or more of the countries in the 
alliance shall be considered as an attack on them all, and is an agreement that collective self-
defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the United nations charter, that enables NATO to 
                                                     
4 Read more about the Berlin-Plus arrangements and NATO-EU cooperation at 
http://www.nato.int/summit2009/topics_en/21-nato-eu_strategic_partnership.html 
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“restore and maintain” the security of the North Atlantic area.5 This implies a willingness to 
retaliate if it is deemed necessary in order to restore and maintain the security of NATO 
members. Where NATO previously emphasized WMDs, followed by an increased participation 
in peacekeeping missions both within and outside of the Euro-Atlantic regions; 2008 marked 
the addition of yet another element to NATO’s collective defence – Cyber-defence (Yost 2010: 
509). This point, however, lacks further scholarly examination.   
 The term “cyber” refers to a digital environment where data is created, stored, and 
shared. It is a distinct domain that has developed into encompassing both virtual space, and the 
physical space that allows the virtual to flow (Singer and Friedman 2014: 13). The 
understanding of this interconnectedness has been rapidly emerging, and while early instances 
of cyber-threats and security was associated with “computers and the internet”, technological 
developments and critical security incidents have broadened the concept of “cyber” to virtually 
anything connected to digital and electronic platforms (ibid: 14-15). 
 It is in between the realms of technological development on the one hand, and security 
on the other, that NATO and cyber security find common ground. If one accepts the notion that 
cyber security has gained prominence and relevance in society, then NATO as a defence 
alliance must deal with the emerging issues that follow.  
 
Cyber Security: Critical Junctures in the Cyber Domain 
 
The examples of Estonia in 2007 (Herzog 2011), Georgia in 2008 (Hollis 2011), the Stuxnet 
worm in 2010 (Herrington and Aldrich 2013; Singer and Friedman 2014: 114-118), and Ukraine 
in 2014 (Rid and Buchanan 2015; Geers 2015) serve as important cases of critical junctures 
with regards to cyber security and warfare.  
 As historical, ethnic, and political tensions rose in Estonia, the Estonian government 
implemented policies with the purpose of limiting Russian influences on Estonian culture 
(Herzog 2011: 49-50). On April 30, 2007, the government moved a Bronze Soldier statue from 
one part of Tallinn to another, which resulted in rioting among the Russian-speaking community 
in Estonia. Accompanying the following weeks of riots were denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks 
targeting the websites of government ministries, banks, and political parties (ibid: 51). Estonia 
relies on the internet for its critical infrastructure to run smoothly; “electronic networks are 
                                                     
5 The North Atlantic Treaty from April 4. 1949 last accessed 14.7.16 from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm  
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integral to (…) government operations, electric power grids, 97 percent of bank transactions 
(…)” (ibid.). The attacks against Estonia signalled the vulnerability to cyber-attacks in a 
modernized society.  
 In August the following year, the long-standing conflict between Russia and Georgia 
led to a five-day war between the two nations. As was experienced in Tallinn, cyber-attacks on 
government networks, finance and communications took place. Additionally, Russian cyber-
attacks were highly coordinated and synchronized with movements on the ground, and the 
ability to deny Georgian communication further tipped the conflict in favour of Russia. This 
approach combined more traditional military approaches with the denial of services of the 
opponent, and acts as a showcase of how a hybrid approach can yield great advantages in 
conflicts. The cyber-component’s role in the conflict has, in hindsight, solidified the idea about 
hybrid warfare as a blend of methods of confusion and aggression (Wirtz 2015: 31-35). 
 The urgent need for revision and bolstering cyber-resilience became evident in the wake 
of the Stuxnet worm. It was a sophisticated cyber-attack on the Iranian nuclear programme, a 
programme that was thought to be heavily protected against breaches (Herrington and Eldrich 
2013). The worm held extraordinary capabilities; it was created to target specific configurations 
in the industrial equipment that would disable atomic centrifuges, and consisted of several zero-
day exploits (Farwell and Rohozinski 2011: 23). The attacks were investigated, and the 
conclusion was that such an attack would not be possible without state-support. Evidence points 
towards both the United States and Israel as the perpetrators (Herrington and Eldrich 2013: 
305).  
 As an extension of previous approaches in neighbouring countries, the Russian invasion 
and occupation in Ukraine 2014 once again brought the concept of hybrid warfare into debate. 
The cyber incidents that occurred in Ukraine are most relevant for this thesis. Ranging from 
sporadic skirmishes of DDoS-attacks and website defacements, to cyber-espionage, cell phone 
network disruptions, and institutionalized and targeted efforts of propaganda, Russian military 
has drawn on an impressive arsenal of weaponry in order to control the information and 
narrative in Ukraine (CCD CoE 2015: 10-11). Cyber can no longer be considered as a temporary 
edge on the battlefield, but must be examined in a context of strategic effects (Geerts 2015: 13). 
As a key component of the overall strategy of Russian warfare, cyber has become a tool which 
primarily dictates the flow of information; not only by blocking access to the communications 
of its targets, but also by flooding information channels with misinformation and propaganda 
(ibid.). Russia employed several methods as a means to achieve the latter. Firstly, the ownership 
of Ukrainian email services by Russian business meant that intercepting Ukrainian government 
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officials’ emails was an easy task (Giles 2015: 23-24). Secondly, malware was employed to 
showcase pro-Russian video-clips and adverts. Thirdly, Russia isolated Crimea from news 
sources of the outside world. This was done by selectively disrupting cable connections to the 
mainland (ibid: 25-26)). These methods combined into what has been described as a “successful 
information campaign” (ibid.), and helped Russia in controlling the narrative of their 
involvements in Crimea.  
These examples serve as illustrations of critical junctures regarding NATO and the cyber 
domain. The attacks on Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine, were effectively attacks on a NATO 
member country, an aspiring NATO member country, and a dithering aspirant country. 
Conjointly, the attacks did, to varying degrees, have a confrontational impact on NATO. 
Therefore, it would be expected for the data analysis to show a spike in associations to “cyber” 
the periods of 2007-2008, and 2014.  
 
Article 5 and The Problem of Attribution  
 
International law with regard to cyber warfare may be considered insufficient to serve its 
purpose for the cases mentioned above. This has been further examined in relation to the 
Russian cyber operations in Ukraine (Stinissen 2015). However, discussions of invoking Article 
5 during the 2007 and 2008 cyber-attacks in Estonia and Georgia did not amount to direct 
response from NATO. The Wales Summit in 2014 proved to be a paradigm shift in this regard, 
as NATO ratified a policy stating that cyber-attacks may lead to an invocation of Article 5 
(NATO 2014; Limnell 2015: 149). There is however no agreement of the specifics of what may 
constitute such an attack. So far, attacks have been “dealt with on a case-by-case basis” (NATO 
declaration Wales Summit 2014), NATO officials have nonetheless voiced concerns about the 
need to establish a clear framework to deal with cyber-attacks. A step in this direction is likely 
to be made at the July 2016 Warsaw Summit (CyCon 2016).  
 Another problem relating to Article 5 is tied to the very nature of the cyber domain. A 
shift in routing information through one or several Internet access points creates difficulties in 
tracing where the attack or malware comes from (Singer and Friedman 2014: 75). This is termed 
the “attribution problem”, and has been the source of much trouble for actors when their systems 
have been attacked. Not only can the process of identifying and proving the perpetrator’s guilt 
be time-consuming, but it can also range from difficult to impossible (Hughes 2010: 528-529). 
Furthermore, if the attack is a worm or malware, it can be constructed in a way that deletes 
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traces of its entry. Additionally, malware and worms can stay within a system for a long time, 
only to be activated based on a certain action of the user of the infected system, or the creator 
of it (Singer and Friedman 2014; Rid and Buchanan 2015). In effect, this means that anyone 
reading this paper could have an infected computer that is ready to act as a vessel for DDoS 
attacks towards someone else at the command of its creator, or that at the command of its 
creator, the malware is set to corrupt the computer’s hard drive. Recent scholarship on the topic, 
however, disputes these difficulties. Some problems that add to the difficulty of cyber security 
in general, and the attribution problem in particular, is a fundamental lack of understanding of 
cyber security. A telling example in this respect is the targeted disruption and espionage of a 
private sector executive in Ukraine. Further research into the executive showed him as a former 
high-ranking government official (Koval 2015: 56). In the same vein, Russian attacks in 
Georgia were impressively coordinated with movements on the ground, which shows at the 
very least cooperation between Russian military and the hackers (Hughes 2010: 529).   
 This difficulty of attributing cyber-attacks, and NATO’s internal difficulties in 
determining the scope of Article 5 applied to offenses carried out in the cyber domain are 
connected. This adversity adds to the problem of hybrid approaches; where methods are mixed 
and the tracing of i.e. Russian intervention and occupation of Ukraine proved blurry (Geers 
2015). This lack of clarity favours the perpetrating actors (ibid.), which adds to the very potency 
of cyber approaches as a means to achieve military victories (Limnell 2015).  
 
Societal Developments and the Information Revolution 
 
The role of NATO with regards to cyber security must be seen in a context of an increasingly 
complex and interconnected society. The openness and connectivity of the Internet is both its 
greatest strength and vulnerability. On the one hand, it promotes technical innovation and serves 
as the backbone of what is dubbed the “information” or “knowledge” age. This knowledge-
based society acts as a modernizing mechanism of how information is created, shared, and 
communicated, and acts as a driving force for social evolution (Humbert 2007). As such, cyber 
connectivity is “the lubricant and catalyst for ever more sophisticated and elusive organised 
crimes” (Granville 2003: 102). On the other hand, in terms of security, cybercrime stems from 
this increasing technological progress and digital interconnectedness within and across states. 
The lack of equally developed security measures and training means that there are a growing 
number of vulnerabilities for hackers to exploit (ibid: 105). The increasing digitisation follows 
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the societal development in which Information Technology (IT) is a driving force. Many 
processes are dependent on IT - to varying degrees - depending on the level of digitisation of a 
given country, banking services, governmental services, communications, and the storage of 
personal data (CSAN-4 2014: 7). Moreover, the sheer amount of devices connected together 
creates “more ways in” for cyber criminals and professionals to exploit. Medical equipment, 
vehicles, cell phones, etc., are often connected to one-another, and a security vulnerability in 
one device can often be an entry point for another (ibid.). The prominence of the “information” 
revolution is thus both a threat to national and international security (Eriksson and Giacomello 
2006: 222), as well as for businesses (Lindsay 2015).   
 Furthermore, the developments of cyberspace and its culminating relevance have 
elevated its influence into the arena of global politics (Reardon and Choucri 2012: 2-3). This 
relevance is linked with cyberspace’s entry into how politics is run. Not only is a majority of 
NGOs, international organizations, governments and ministries now present on digital 
platforms as sources of information; they are also exposed to influence from anyone else that 
is also digitally connected (ibid.). As a result of the interconnectedness of societies, the same 
effect has been present in the political aspects of a globalized world (ibid: 8). Essentially, this 
connectivity means that the increasing amount of actors connected in the digital sphere also 
increases the amount of exploitable vulnerabilities (ibid.).   
 
Critical Infrastructure   
 
Some examples of exploitable vulnerabilities are tied to the notion of “critical infrastructure”; 
an all-encompassing term that refers to all systems that power “modern-day civilization”, i.e. 
electronically driven manufacturing, communications, emergency services, financial services, 
and transportation sectors.6 The future of cyber defence and resilience of critical infrastructure 
hinges upon several factors. Some of the most conspicuous ones include an improved 
cooperation between the public and private sector when it comes to security, adequate training 
of personnel, defined information and communications policies, and a successful transition and 
facilitation of “system diversity”; which mixes digital, analogue, and manual systems 
(Herrington and Aldrich 2013; ibid.: 306). 
                                                     
6 As defined by Homeland Security. Read more about the 16 critical sectors in the US at: 
https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors 
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 Attacks on critical infrastructure mean that “cyberspace [is] play[ing] an increasingly 
important role” (Ionatamishvili and Svetoka 2015: 103-104). A targeted attack on computerized 
systems is imperceptibly accepted as an attack on the very systems that run the daily lives and 
business of people, sustain critical infrastructure and runs financial transactions (ibid.). 
Additionally, attacks on – or infiltration of - strategic communications have taken a leading role 
in offensive cyber strategy. In effect, this means that cyber-attacks have the potency to greatly 
affect the lives of the civil population in a given country, and that with a security definition that 
goes beyond the infantile: afflict the security of people in their ability to communicate, travel, 
use basic digital and electronic services, and access money (Granville 2003; Herrington and 
Aldrich 2013). If NATO is unable to protect these sectors of its member countries, it is failing 
at its original aims; safeguarding liberal principles, and preserving peace and security.7 
 
Gaps and Implications from existing literature 
 
The review of existing scholarship accentuates a range of different aspects of cyber and 
security. In NATO’s case the things that engage with its reason for existence is of especially 
high relevance. Yost (2010) accounts for NATO’s development and purpose; a purpose in 
which adapting to security trends is at the heart of the organization. The lack of research on 
how NATO is prepared to deal with cyber security trends must be considered a gap in the 
literature. Although there is NATO-published literature such as the Tallinn Manual8 and other 
CCDCoE publications, there is no prevalent academic literature on this topic; a void this thesis 
aims to help fill. Moreover, the incidents in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine all bring expectations 
of a change in NATO. This is based on the framework of strategic culture. As this thesis 
measures both word frequency (prominence) and change over time (conceptualization), it tests 
the expectations of strategic culture on NATO’s outward communication between 2002-2016. 
The research method this paper uses has not been used in earlier investigations into the topic. 
Content Analysis Results: Findings of Prominence and 
Conceptualization 
 
                                                     
7 The North Atlantic Treaty from April 4. 1949.  
The manual is available at https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html 
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This section deals with the findings of the quantitative and qualitative analyses. The results of 
the quantitative analysis illustrate two main points: firstly, it shows the relative prominence of 
“cyber” vis-à-vis other aspects NATO deem as important. Secondly, it elucidates several 
aspects of NATO’s strategic culture. Namely, the continuation of Russia as NATO’s main 
concern, the multidimensional nature of which NATO has increased its focus into several 
domains of warfare, and the spike in frequency of “cyber” in the wake of major, critical 
incidents. The research questions this section tackles are,  
“how has NATO’s perception of the prominence of cyber security changed from 2002-
2016”, and, “how has NATO’s conceptualization of ‘cyber’ changed in the same timeframe?”. 
Moreover, this section tests the following four hypotheses, 
 
H1: The frequency in mentions of “cyber” in NATO official documents has increased in the 
time period 2002-2016. 
H2: Critical junctures in the period of 2007-2009 and in 2014 provides reason for higher 
frequency in mentions of “cyber”. 
H3: Once a critical juncture is reached, the milieu and operation of NATO is transformed and 
thus forced to reformulate “cyber” as a conspicuous security dimension. 
H4: The rapidly developing security environment has led to a richer association of the concept 
of “cyber” over time. 
 
The Increasing Prominence of Cyber(Security) as perceived by NATO 
 
This section ensues a discussion based on the findings of the quantitative content analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
   Year Cyber 
New 
Threats 
Stability & 
Security  The 
Region Terrorism 
Proliferation 
WMD 
Biological,Nuclear, 
Chemical Weapons Russia 
Article 
5 
2002 2 1 3 19 8 2 46 2 
2003 1 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 
2004 1 3 2 36 17 7 16 0 
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2005 1 0 0 4 0 0 21 0 
2006 2 0 2 13 9 2 14 0 
2007 6 2 0 3 1 1 1 0 
2008 9 0 1 12 16 8 22 1 
2009 7 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2010 20 0 3 8 16 8 19 2 
2011 3 1 0 1 0 1 4 0 
2012 15 0 2 14 15 9 35 1 
2013 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 
2014 20 0 2 13 13 14 46 3 
2015 9 0 0 0 0 0 8 1 
2016 2 0 1 3 0 0 42 1 
Total 100 7 18 130 95 55 277 11 
 
Table 1: Word Frequency 
 
 
The Relative Prominence of Cyber 
 
As shown in table 1, “cyber” ranks third in mentions (100) behind “Russia” (277) and 
“terrorism” (130). In relative terms, “cyber” is perceived as one of three key issues for NATO. 
However, mentions of “Russia” still dominate the discourse of NATO summits and speeches, 
with recurring counts of “terrorism” keeping “cyber” in third place.  
These findings relate to two different explanations in academic literature. Firstly, the context in 
which three nations with varying ties to NATO; Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine, all experienced 
cyber-attacks. These attacks could be perceived as critical junctures for NATO, with the result 
being added pressures on the dominant culture in its milieu. In turn, this pressure challenges the 
validity of the pre-agreed upon solutions to deal with shocks, and can spur transformation in 
the strategic culture of NATO as a means to deal with new challenges. Secondly, NATO’s 
incorporation and refinement of defence Article is consistent with the findings of table 1. The 
increase in mentions of “cyber”, assumes a growth in the importance of “cyber”. These findings 
speak to the validity of H1 and H2: H1 is, in accordance with the existing scholarship on societal 
developments and NATO’s development alike, unsurprising. The boost in frequency over time 
affirms “cyber” as a prominent and aspiring dimension of the perceived security environment 
that NATO operates in. Moreover, it offers support for the claims of H2; the periods of 2007-
2009 and 2014 serve as illustrations of spikes in the count of “cyber” mentions. Table 1 also 
displays a contrast that serves as falsification; none of the other terms experienced similar spikes 
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in the same time period. This constitutes as proof that it was the “cyber” term alone - not the 
whole range of concepts - that saw an increase in this period.  
 Moreover, as existing scholarship suggests, NATO’s inclusion of “cyber” to its 
collective defence strategy in 2008 is reflected in the frequency of “cyber” mentions in table 1. 
This contributes to the framework of strategic culture in which shocks ultimately serve as 
catalysts for change. NATO’s adaptation to the shocks following the 2007 and 2008 cyber-
attacks, appears to have served as “dramatic enough” to fundamentally challenge the dominant 
culture, and thus result in the modification in behaviour; adding “cyber” as a dimension of 
collective defence. Additionally, these findings connect to H3 as the drastic change in policy is 
derived from an internal change based on external pressures. In order to prove H3, a qualitative 
analysis is required. The qualitative section examines H3 by looking at the change in 
conceptualization in the same time-period. 
 
Qualitative examination of quantitative findings 
 
Table 1 shows a large increase in mentions of ‘’cyber’’ in NATO summits from 2002 in Prague 
(1) to the 2014 Cardiff summit (20). When looking at speeches held by the secretary generals, 
however, mentions of ‘’cyber’’ have remained at a consistently low level except for two 
outliers; Fogh Rasmussen’s speech in 2009 and Jens Stoltenberg’s keynote speech in 20159. 
Fogh Rasmussen’s speech must be seen in context of the 2007 and 2008 cyber-attacks in Tallinn 
and Georgia respectively. Stoltenberg’s speech adheres to the assumption of an increase in 
emphasizing the cyber component in defence matters, and could be seen as a build-up to the 
assumed acknowledgement of cyber as the fifth domain of warfare in the 2016 Warsaw summit.  
Furthermore, the control words used in the analyses show consistency in mentions of 
the “proliferation of nuclear weapons”, “terrorism”, and “Russia”. These coincide with 
expectations from the framework of strategic culture in which large organizations, such as a 
military alliance, change slowly and over time if not fundamentally challenged by shocks. It 
also assumes the organization to preserve its agreed-upon conceptions about the world. The 
consistency of “Russia” as the main concern is inextricably connected with the very creation of 
the alliance, and thus its identity. As Yost (2010) argues, the very purpose behind establishing 
a North-Atlantic Treaty stems from the Cold War and the need to deter Russian influence and 
                                                     
9 See Literature list for links to the speeches. 
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aggression. Consequently, the milieu within NATO would be expected to hold a set of 
assumptions that leads to a preserving of the status quo. This implies a willingness to 
(re)produce the narrative of Russia as an “other”, whilst also constituting how NATO sees itself 
vis-à-vis the security environment. Finally, since interest is shaped by a shift of identities and 
norms (Eriksson and Giacomello 2014), the NATO-Russian relationship is expected to remain 
as it is – or at most see a slow change over time.   
 
 
 
Graph 1:  Linear Cyber Over Time 
 
In graph 1, the substantial increase in word frequency for “cyber” serves as a representation for 
its growing importance for NATO between 2002-2016. The spike from 2006, to the 2007-2009 
period and its following augmentation in 2014, supports the hypothesis that critical junctures 
between 2007-2009, and in 2014, manifested in the rhetoric of NATO.   
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Graph 2: Exponential Cyber Summits 
 
By isolating the bi-annual summits from 2002-2014 from the speeches in the odd years (2003-
2015) and 2016, the growing importance of “cyber” experienced a skyrocketing starting in the 
time-period between the 2006 summit in Riga, and the 2008 summit in Bucharest. The 
exponential growth is elucidated in the dotted trend line, and implies continued growth in cyber 
mentions in the future whilst further bolstering the findings of 2007-2009 as a key period for 
NATO’s cyber development. This solidifies the validity of H2 as it stresses the peaks while also 
highlighting the trend of cyber as an increasingly important concept for NATO. 
 
This section presents strong support for the claims of H1 and H2. Expectations of a growing 
recurrence of “cyber” mentions between 2002-2016, as well as apparent peaks during critical 
junctures. Moreover, it indicates support of H3. This support is further examined in the section 
below.  
 
Conceptualization: Cyber - a volatile concept 
 
The conceptualization tables10 offer four main findings. Firstly, this section will discuss the 
genealogy of the “cyber” concept over the time period of the analysis (2002-2016). Secondly, 
a discussion of the change in strategic culture and norms transpires. Thirdly, the associations to 
                                                     
10 See Appendix B for the coding scheme and entire output used in this section. 
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“cyber” within the body of documents is discussed; with an analysis of NATO and Article 5, 
and an analysis of the findings with regards to NATO’s focus on states and non-state actors in 
its cyber discourse. 
 
Genealogy and Richness of “cyber” as a concept  
 
The initial question the qualitative content analysis sets out to illuminate whether the “cyber”-
term gained a richer association over time. As established in the quantitative analysis section, 
critical junctures have played an important role in challenging the dominant culture and norms 
of NATO. The section below explores the genealogy and richness of the “cyber” concept over 
time, and is employed in order to trace the evidence from the quantitative analysis through 
qualitative means. 
  
The genealogy of the cyber dimension offers some interesting findings (Appendix B). Most 
remarkable, perhaps, is the timing of a richer and complex projection of NATO’s understanding 
of cyber and associated terms in relation to the conjunctures of cyber-attacks on Estonia, 
Georgia, and Ukraine respectively. In 2007, for instance, the association of power grids, 
banking systems, government services and IT infrastructure was a major development from the 
vague mentions of “cyber-attacks” and “cyber-defence” in the preceding years. In 2008, the 
concept of cyber saw an expansion that built upon the 2007 developments, but also saw the 
interplay between cyber defence and energy security add to it, with an emphasis of protecting 
Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs). Since a broadened association adds 
took place, this finding supports H3. 
In the time period between 2008-2014, the concept of cyber saw a more extensive 
understanding of the relationship between governments, private companies, and its potential 
impact on economies. Furthermore, an elucidation of the need for cooperation with both the 
European Union and the United Nations in not only defending against cyber-attacks and 
preventing cyber-crime, but also in carrying out common research and development strategies 
to better bolster defences against the new types of security threats. While briefly mentioned in 
earlier official documents, 2010 marked the year where NATO thoroughly demonstrated a more 
sophisticated stance on cyber policies. This projected an (outwards) approach and clarity in the 
necessity of breaking down the cyber dimension into bite-sized chunks; with detection, 
assessment, prevention, defence, and recovery as lone-standing as well as interlinked aspects 
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of NATO’s cyber security. Additionally, this time-period was an acknowledgement of the 
growing numbers and sophistication of attacks done in cyber-space. All the above mentioned 
changes are consistently linked to the paramount importance of protecting the alliance and its 
member countries’ critical infrastructure; as mentioned in relation to the potential impact of 
cyber-attacks, and how they have the potential to affect power grids, houses, cities, air traffic 
controls, and banking services etc. 
From 2011-2012, the need for research and cooperation was yet again emphasized as a 
key step towards maintaining security. In an environment that is rapidly evolving, and where it 
can be difficult to separate piracy and cyber-crime from terrorist groups or non-state actors with 
digital weapons, the notion of borderless, trans-national threats was underlined. The Wales 
summit declaration marks a change in the concentration of attention for NATO. In the wake of 
Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, where “little green men”, information warfare, and support 
of rebel groups in Ukraine were just a few of the tactics employed by the Kremlin; a call for 
modernization symbolized the summit. The concept of cyber was enlarged to encompass the 
complexity of the dynamic of cyber defence and national defence. The Wales summit 
declaration appears to have been a paradigmatic shift for NATO and cyber security. Attacks 
were described as increasing in quantity and volatility. The cyber policy presented as a 
confirmation of the 2010 specifics on how to prevent, detect, recover, defend, and build 
resilience. The most prominent change in NATO’s discourse of 2014, however, was the 
acknowledgement that cyber-attacks can trigger Article 5. The next section deals with the 
Article 5-problems of NATO in more detail. Moreover, a declared goal of integrating a cyber-
component to NATO operation would also characterize a paradigm shift on how NATO carries 
out operations. This development originates from the need to improve and increase training, 
exercise, and education of personnel in the dimension of cyber. The time-period 2010-2014 
adds another pillar of support to H3, as the concept of cyber saw a widening of associations of 
encompassing terms and concepts. Moreover, it supports the notion of H4, in which the security 
environment directly affected the degree of association of “cyber”. 
The cyber term saw a strengthening towards this direction in 2015 and 2016: 2015 was 
a ground-breaking year with regards to NATO’s discourse on cyber security and cyber defence. 
There are three main facets of this: Firstly, “Cyber is now part of all crises and conflicts”11 
speaks to not only the prominence of cyber, but also the need to integrate a conscious cyber 
policy to all aspects of NATO. Secondly, the notion that a cyber-attack can trigger Article 5 has 
                                                     
11 See literature list for link to Secretary General Stoltenberg’s Keynote Speech in 2015 
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at this point in time become recurring. In effect, this could have decisive implications on how 
NATO prepares for, and responds to cyber-attacks. Lastly, for the first time in an official 
document, cyber and hybrid warfare are discussed as inextricably linked. With regards to the 
need to adapt to a new security environment, the concept of “cyber” has at this point in time 
reached such a level of complexity and prominence that NATO implicitly has to undergo some 
sort of re-structuring of the alliance’s ways to deal with this reality. Speeches from 2016 
reinforces the necessity of improving NATO’s resilience to deal with both cyber and hybrid 
threats. Furthermore, the secretary general urges the need for an improvement with regards to 
NATO’s cyber defence. 
In sum, starting from 2007 in particular, the conceptualization of cyber has grown to 
embody a rich variety of associations. The genealogical approach provides an elucidation of 
this enrichening that supports both H3 and H4. This augmentation has serious implications for 
two reasons. Firstly, it reveals how NATO sees the cyber component of the security 
environment it operates in. Secondly, it means that NATO is urged to change how it responds 
to cyber security matters. The second point is discussed alongside other findings from the 
qualitative content analysis in detail below. 
 
CyCon 2016 and Article 5 – Imminent Change 
 
An important aspect of the changing conceptualization of cyber is its leaning towards 
association with warfare and Article 5. The low-frequency, irregular mentions of Article 5 in 
the first content analysis in table 1 speaks to the complexity of the cyber issue. The qualitative 
content analysis shows that cyber and Article 5 were first mentioned together at the Wales 
summit in 2014, and then re-stated the year after in a keynote speech held by the secretary 
general. The lack of outwards projection about their (potential) constitutive relationship raises 
several questions. Was this a deliberate effort in order to avoid taking drastic action against the 
early developments of cyber-attacks against member states? Was the lack of mentions grounded 
in a generally shallow understanding of their interplay, and if so – a result of the slow 
developments of a big defensive alliance? Or perhaps the internal norms of NATO played a 
dictating role in setting the agenda for priorities and willingness to act? Additionally, if the 
latter question rings true, a thorough examination of how NATO sees its own identity could 
shed light on the phenomenon. The quantitative content analysis shows a consistent and 
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frequent reference to Russia - the traditional enemy12. It also shows consistent mentions of 
terrorism and proliferation of WMDs. These things (Yost 2010; Sowers 2009) could stem from 
NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan since 2001 after the terrorist attack of 9/11, an invasion 
and occupation justified on grounds of the possession of weapons of mass destruction. If NATO 
saw these as the core associative concepts in relation to Article 5, then changing or adding to 
this course by acknowledging cyber-attacks to trigger the same consequences could have 
blurred the direction NATO was growing towards.  
 The 8th CyCon of June 2016 a conference organized by the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCoE), sheds further light on this topic. In practical terms, 
the NATO high officials attending and speaking at the conference is herein understood as an 
extension of the views and concerns of NATO itself. The opening speaker, Toomas Ilves13, 
both president of Estonia and a board member of the advisory board of Center for Internet 
Security, highlighted several points that correlate with the content analyses of this paper. Firstly, 
Ilves accounts for the various ways in which a cyber-attack has the potential to hurt a country’s 
critical infrastructure. Furthermore, a throwback to the decision not to invoke Article 5 at the 
time of the 2007 cyber-attacks acted as a transition into voicing expectations about cyber being 
named the 5th domain of warfare at the Warsaw Summit in July 2016. This would follow land, 
air, sea, and space, and have major implications for the structure and ways of operation within 
NATO. The Czech minister of defence Martin Stropnicky expanded on the inclusion of cyber 
as the 5th domain of warfare, arguing that this would have two main implications. Firstly, the 
recognition of cyber as a domain of warfare would increase budgets allocated to cyber security. 
Secondly, it would require mass-recruitment and training of experienced cyber specialists. 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia, Manfred Nielson, 
expressed the necessary emphasis on the research and documentation carried out by the 
CCDCoE as a means to combat cyber threats. Additionally, Nielson urged the crowd to agree 
to recognizing cyber as a fifth domain of warfare, and pointed out that cyber cannot be limited 
by military perspectives. By the latter point, Nielson refers to the role of cyber in all aspects of 
organization, defence, surveillance, intelligence, and also offense.  
 In the following panel debate of CyCon 201614, the increasing dependence on IT in 
military operations was the subject of accentuation. Moreover, the recognition of the 5th 
dimension of warfare in Warsaw would both increase NATO’s power in modern and future 
                                                     
12 See table 1 
13 See https://youtu.be/j34jptiIxlQ?t=631 for Ilves’ speech. 
14 See https://youtu.be/j34jptiIxlQ?t=7437 for the panel debate of day 1 of CyCon 2016. 
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warfare by implicitly stating the need for adding cyber capabilities to the alliance. Furthermore, 
Hans Folmer, commander of the Dutch Defence Cyber Commando identifies that the 
implementation of cyber as a dimension would lead to conceptual implications. Not only with 
cyber as an isolated component, but also the interplay with a potential NATO cyber command 
and the other commands for the four other dimensions. Major General and director of Cyber 
Intelligence and Information Integration in the UK, James Hockenhull extends the point of 
inter-organisational cooperation as a changing structure as a result of cyber-implementation. 
Not only would wielding these powers increase NATO’s precision and usefulness, but it is also 
deemed a necessity to deal with the emerging hybrid approaches to warfare. Furthermore, 
Hockenhull strongly emphasized the need for NATO to develop a succinct and sufficient cyber 
doctrine. This could act as a step towards taking a leading role in developing norms in cyber 
space, and facilitate further cooperation both internally but also with other large organizations 
and governments. An interesting lesson learnt from the panel debate at CyCon was the 
disagreement about the need for developing offensive capabilities alongside the defensive ones. 
Finally, the topic of deterrence was linked to cyber. Deterrence, according to Hockenhull, 
hinges on the credibility of one’s ability to strike back. The asymmetric nature of cyber, 
however, creates another problem: one must define the appropriateness of retaliation not onto 
property or human beings, but into the digital space. This is a problem NATO must deal with 
going forward.  
 Both Ilves’ speech and the panel debate illustrates an understanding of cyberspace and 
its implications to be of a more sophisticated nature than NATO’s cyber policies indicate. This 
implies a changing culture within certain groups of NATO high officials that is ahead of the 
curve compared to what has been the dominant culture. This section challenges the strength of 
H3. While it is clear that the cyber dimension has gained importance, the transformation appears 
to be an ongoing process rather than a complete change in the milieu, and the expected 
subsequent reformulation of “cyber”. The culture and norms that are found in NATO’s milieu 
are examined in the next section. 
 
NATO’s Strategic Culture and Norms  
 
Katzenstein (1996) contends that the endurance of NATO as an organization after the end of 
the cold war can be explained, in part, by the perceived common threats towards the alliance 
itself (chapter 10, 1996). An acknowledgement of the non-state agencies in international politics 
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guides understanding of how cultures and norms develop both within these structures and by 
themselves, but additionally how the same cultures and norms are shaped by external pressures. 
As a certain culture develops and becomes embedded within an institution, it shapes both the 
decision-making process and identity of said institution (ibid.). This must be seen in a context 
where identity constitutes both self and other; NATO and Russia; NATO and terrorists; NATO 
and cyber criminals, and so forth. Moreover, norms serve “as collective understandings of 
appropriate behaviour (…)” (ibid.). By building on this, we can see that NATO’s is consistent 
with regards to mentions of “Russia” in particular, but also “terrorism”, and “proliferation of 
WMDs”15. The quantitative content analysis guides understanding of the norms guiding what 
constitutes appropriate behaviour. Correspondingly, the consistency in a lack of mentions of 
“cyber” and “Article 5” together before the 2014 Wales summit tells us one out of two things. 
The first alternative is that the outwards projection of threatening to retaliate to cyber-attacks 
in the same manner as attacks through other dimensions would trigger the collective defence 
clause which was deemed unwanted. Whichever components complete the sum of appropriate 
behaviour and thus identity of the institution adds together and maintains a more careful 
approach to the relationship between “Article 5” and “cyber”. The other alternative is that 
internal norms and preferences (organizational culture) had decision-makers overestimating the 
importance of their own branches and tasks of the organization. This is not necessarily a 
conscious process, but the result is regardless a cognitive bias in which one’s own work and its 
importance is judged at an artificially high level. This can result in the organization rejecting 
new developments for a longer time than what might be beneficial (Lantis 2002; Banchoff 
1999). Consequently, the slow change in milieu in NATO is expected. As H3 asserts, significant 
change takes place in the wake of critical junctures. Therefore, the opposite must also ring true: 
if critical junctures are not perceived as critical enough, change is not an automated response. 
Moreover, it illuminates a disconnect between H3 and H4; while the enrichening association of 
“cyber” took place in the time period, it did not lead to the perception of a critical juncture by 
default. 
 This section contains that NATO’s strategic culture and norms are the products of an 
embedded culture within the organization. This culture constitutes the milieu of NATO, and is 
constantly exposed to a varying degree of scrutiny – from internal and external pressures alike. 
With this in mind, the next section examines the change from 2002-2016 in which actors NATO 
has associated with cyberspace.  
                                                     
15 See table 1. 
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Who is the threat? Actors in Cyberspace 
 
The content analysis shows a clear change in which actors NATO associate with “cyber”. In 
the period 2002-2005, cyber is either mentioned as a vague concept, or in the same breath as 
terrorism. 16 The general focus on terrorism in the wake of 9/11 and the 2005 Madrid bombings 
is unsurprising. However, the link between cyber and terrorism does imply a mild connection 
between associations of cyber, and non-state actors performing illicit and dangerous acts 
towards members of the alliance. In 2006 this was expanded further by including the notion of 
crime networks, drug profits and nuclear proliferation alongside cyber space threats, as “new 
threats”. In the wake of the 2007 Estonia attacks, the state re-enters the focal point of discourse: 
not only can states take actions to bolster their defenses against cyber-attacks, but cyber-attacks 
can shut down several key societal infrastructures such as power grids, government services, 
banks, and military facilities. In 2008, the unambiguous re-introduction of non-state actors as 
potential threats for NATO member states again took prominence. This follows an implicit 
understanding of a two-way channel that is cyber space that can affect both states and non-state 
actors, and the perpetrator could also be either of the two. In 200917 after both Estonia and 
Georgia had suffered severe cyber-attacks, signified a return to a state-centric approach to cyber 
security. The impact of attacks on economic and governmental infrastructure emphasized that 
both services and economic institutions in a country can be the victims of attacks. In 2010 the 
documents highlight a more in-depth examination of the potential effects of attacks, previously 
described as lethal towards, 
 
 “key infrastructure, economic institutions, and banks”, the Bucharest meeting in 2010 
offered specific effects, “A well-orchestrated cyber-attack can turn off the power in your house, 
your city, your country. It can shut down air traffic control. It can shut down banks. In short, a 
cyber-attack can bring a country down without a single soldier having to cross its borders.”18  
In the very same speech, NATO implicitly calls out Russia as the perpetrator by 
referring to the attacks as “coordinated”. This marks a point in the understanding of cyber-
warfare as a blurry arena in which states can coordinate attacks with non-state actors, making 
                                                     
16 See Appendix A for the documents inferred from regarding this time-period; see Appendix B for the encoded 
output used in this analysis. 
17 Ibid.: time period 2006-2009 
18 Ibid.: 2010 
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the problem of attribution with regards to international law a difficult matter to pursue. The 
period from 2011-2014 is less focused around actors in cyber space19 and more concerned with 
the ways research, development, and inter-organizational cooperation can better collective 
defense. Starting with the Wales summit in 2014, and onwards to Stoltenberg’s speech in 201620, 
the statements change focus again, and discuss the need to enhance capabilities in order to 
maintain the alliance’s goals of Euro-Atlantic as well as national security. 
All things considered, Russia remains NATO’s focus point when discussing threatening 
actors in a security context. However, a gradual but evident accept of a non-state actors as 
important players in cyberspace has taken place since 2002. From 2014 onwards, these appear 
together and are at times indistinguishable in NATO rhetoric. This links to the nature of the 
cyber-attacks in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine – where the cooperation between non-state 
actors and Russia serves as a lesson for NATO in understanding the inseparable nature of the 
two.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The increasing prominence of cyber as a domain in international security makes the study of 
how key actors perceive its ensuing threats a topic of growing importance. This thesis has 
utilized a constructivist approach in order to meaningfully examine NATO’s perception of the 
prominence and conceptualization of the cyber component in security. Furthermore, it has 
advanced this understanding by viewing NATO’s resistance to change through a lens of 
strategic culture; the dominant cultures within NATO have remained weighty until the pressure 
exerted by external shocks forced a reaction from within. The focus on NATO’s internal culture 
versus an ever changing security environment, propelled by the interconnectedness of 
technology and society, has proved useful in making sense of the impact of critical junctures 
on NATO perceptions, and ultimately a reformulation in understanding of what “cyber” is, and 
the threats it facilitates.  
The research questions, “how has NATO’s perception of the prominence of cyber 
security changed from 2002-2016”, and, “how has NATO’s conceptualization of ‘cyber’ 
changed in the same timeframe?” have been answered by analysing the results of quantitative 
and a qualitative content analyses. As strategic culture theory expects, these results emphasize 
                                                     
19 Ibid.: 2011-2014 
20 Ibid.: 2014-2016 
29 
 
the catalysing impact of critical junctures as a pre-requisite for rapid and substantial change. 
Moreover, while the findings of the results are based solely off official NATO documents and 
thus only add to understanding of the case of NATO and cyber security, they also echo Eriksson 
and Giacomello (2006) and Klotz and Lynch (2007)’s ideational emphasis within the field of 
security studies in a digital age. In addition, the focus on shifting norms and identities within 
organizations could prove a fruitful focus when examining other actors and their perceptions of 
the security environment. While it does not equate to an ability to predict behaviour, it has 
identified an entry point for discovery; by analysing political communication in the context of 
emerging and transformative security threats, the way an organization projects its perception 
offers clues to when and how they are prepared to change.  
Furthermore, this thesis has tested the claims of four hypotheses. Both H1 and H2 were 
rigorously proved true in the quantitative analysis. H1 was argued to correlate with existing 
scholarship on both societal developments and NATO’s development. H1 was further tested by 
isolating summit declarations from 2002-2014 from NATO official speeches, which saw a 
drastic increase in prominence in the given timeframe. These findings are inextricably linked 
with H2, as the spikes in “cyber mentions” from 2007-2009 and in 2014 explain a large part of 
the change that constitutes H1. These findings find further support in that only “cyber” saw this 
boost in mentions. Graph 2 adds to this understanding by highlighting the two periods as critical 
junctures that altered NATO’s cyber perception. An expansion of the body of documents would 
add strength to both H1 and H2’s claims. H3 finds moderate support in the descriptive statistics 
in table 1. However, a qualitative analysis was necessary to adequately measure its accuracy. 
Through a genealogical examination of the qualitative data, several reformulations of “cyber” 
were identified. These speak both to its timing with regards to critical junctures as well as 
progressive reformulations of “cyber” over time. The results of examining H3 has serious 
implications. Essentially, by acknowledging cyber as a key domain in security, NATO must re-
evaluate how it prepares for and responds to cyber security matters. Finally, H4 expounds a 
nuance to H3 through the disconnect between H3 and H4; an enrichening association of “cyber” 
did take place, however, it did not lead to the perception of a critical juncture by default. In 
other words, measures did not automatically follow what has been perceived as critical 
junctures. 
The main implications of this research, is the reaffirmation of constructivism and 
strategic culture theory as an appropriate combination when researching security in the digital 
age. This thesis confirms that intra-organizational military cultures are resistant to change 
through the reproductive function of cultural domination and its ripple effects on how NATO’s 
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shared beliefs and norms constitute a milieu that dictates the range of options available to deal 
with new challenges. Consequently, an increasing self-awareness towards this culture could 
help alter the strength and subsequent effects of dominant strategic cultures to increase NATO’s 
adaptability towards new challenges. Moreover, the methods applied in examining NATO and 
cyber security are inexpensive and easily replicable. A similar script and theoretical framework 
could be applied to other organizations such as the European Union, which would allow for a 
comparative study of the two organizations. This type of research could foster a shared 
understanding of the respective organizations and their strategic culture, which in turn could 
improve the grounds for cooperation in the future. 
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Appendix A 
 
Below is the script required to run the analysis in R 3.1.1 Every line starting with a # is a 
comment line, which explains the function of the commands below it. 
 
R-Script  
 
# Text Mining - NATO and Cyber 
 
# Before running the code, put all documents in one folder, entitled "sources" 
 
library(tm) 
library(stringr) 
library(dplyr) 
 
#---------- Analysis 1 ----------# 
# List the 8 keywords of interest21 
term <- c("cyber", 
          "new threats", 
          "regional stability|regional security|regional defense|regional defence", 
          "terrorism", 
          "proliferation", # of weapon/s of mass destruction 
          "biological weapon|nuclear weapon|chemical weapon|weapon of mass 
destruction|weapons of mass destruction", 
                                                     
21 Note: Analyses were done with additional words such as “internet”, “computer”, “digital”, without a difference 
in output. The script is therefore kept as simple as possible. 
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          "russia", 
          "article 5") 
 
# Create a vector of PDF file names 
files <- list.files(path = "sources", pattern = "pdf$") 
 
# create function to read in PDF files 
Rpdf <- readPDF(control = list(text = "-layout")) 
 
# Convert the PDF files to text and store them in corpus 
corpus <- Corpus(URISource(paste0("sources/", files)),  
                             readerControl = list(reader = Rpdf)) 
 
# Clean the corpus for better matching of search terms 
clean <- function (corpus) { 
    # convert words to lower case 
    cleaned  <- tm_map(corpus, content_transformer(tolower)) 
     
    # remove white spaces 
    cleaned <- tm_map(cleaned, stripWhitespace) 
     
    # remove punctuation 
    cleaned <- tm_map(cleaned, removePunctuation) 
     
    return (cleaned)   
} 
 
cleaned.corpus <- clean(corpus) 
 
# Initialize frequency table 
df <- data.frame(matrix(NA, ncol=9), 
                 row.names = NULL, 
                 stringsAsFactors = FALSE) 
 
# Rename columns of frequency table 
name <- c("cyber", 
          "new.threats", 
          "regional.stability.security.defence", 
          "terrorism", 
          "proliferation", # of weapon/s of mass destruction 
          "biological.nuclear.chemical.weapon", 
          "russia", 
          "article5") 
colnames(df) <- c("file", name) 
 
# Iterate through each filename and search term to record frequency 
for (i in 1:length(files)) { 
    df[i,1] <- files[i] 
    for (j in 1:length(term)) { 
        df[i,j+1] <- sum(str_count(cleaned.corpus[[i]]$content, term[j])) 
40 
 
    } 
} 
write.csv(df, "Prominence.csv", row.names = FALSE) 
 
 
#---------- Analysis 2 ----------# 
# Initialize data frame 
par <- data.frame(matrix(ncol=3), 
                 row.names = NULL, 
                 stringsAsFactors = FALSE) 
 
# Rename columns of data frame 
par.name <- c("paragraph", 
          "file", 
          "line.no") 
colnames(par) <- par.name 
 
# Iterate through each filename and record paragraphs with "cyber" 
for (i in 1:length(files)) { 
    add.para <- cleaned.corpus[[i]]$content[grepl("cyber", cleaned.corpus[[i]]$content)] 
    add.line <- grep("cyber", cleaned.corpus[[i]]$content) 
    add.file <- rep(files[i], length(add.para)) 
     
    add.par <- cbind(add.para, add.file, add.line) 
    colnames(add.par) <- par.name 
    par <- rbind(par, add.par) 
} 
write.csv(na.omit(par), "Paragraphs.csv", row.names = FALSE) 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Appendix B contains the coding scheme and full output of the qualitative conceptualization 
analysis of the content.  
 
Coding Scheme 
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[1] Blunt or vague statement  
[2] Associations with cyber and other concepts 
[3] Statement indicating complexity of cyber 
 
2002: 
 Cyber-attacks [1] 
 Cyber warfare [2] 
 Borderless threats [3] 
The initial awareness of cyber as a concept, combines attacks and warfare with the idea of 
borderless threats. 
2003: 
 Cyber-attack [1] 
2004: 
 Cyber security [1] 
2005:  
 Cyber space [1] 
2006: 
 Cyber-attack [1] 
 Protecting Information and Communications Technology (ICT) [2] 
This year saw a minor shift, as the focus turned to protecting ICTs from cyber-attacks. 
2007: 
 Cyber-attack [1] 
 IT Infrastructure [2] 
 Cyber defence [1] 
 Power grids, banking systems, government services [2] 
 Economic impact of attacks on critical infrastructure [2] 
In 2007 a connection between IT infrastructure and specifics like power grids, banking systems, 
and government services were made. This follows the context of the 2007 cyber-attacks on 
Estonia. Furthermore, it displays NATO realizing the potential effects on the economy by 
cyber-attacks. 
2008: 
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 Non-state actors and globalization affecting security [3] 
 Cyber-attack [1] 
 Operational requirements (…) cyber defence and energy security [2] [3] 
 Cyber defence policy [1] 
 CCDCoE [1] 
 Cyber defence [1] 
 Protecting ICTs [2] 
 Countering cyber-attacks [1] 
 Developing capabilities of cyber defence [1] 
2008 was a big year for NATO and cyber security. The previous years’ attacks on Estonia, and 
2008’s cyber-attacks on Georgia made for a more complex understanding of the cyber 
component in warfare. Firstly, the complexity of non-state actors in a globalized world is 
described as an increasing threat to security. Secondly, cyber defence and energy security are 
linked, and the need to protect NATO’s ICTs emphasized. A growing need to invest and 
develop in cyber defence, both through the CCDCoE, as well as within member states appears 
in the discourse.  
2009: 
 Cyber security [1] 
 Governments and private companies both launch attacks [2] [3] 
 Private companies suffer lost revenue, data, and services [2] 
 Cooperation between public and private sectors necessary [1] 
 Cyber defence improvements [1] 
 Difference between piracy and cyber security [1] 
 Costs for both industry and governments of cyber-attacks [1] 
 Cyber defence [1] 
 Attacks of industry and government websites daily [1] 
In 2009, the actors involved when discussing cyber security see an expansion that now includes 
both governments and private companies. From a defensive point of view, the attacks allegedly 
performed by Russia in the previous two years had to depend on a coordination between non-
state and state actors to be effective. Moreover, this showed promise to have severe impact on 
private companies’ revenue, data retainment, and ability to perform services. Exemplified by 
the temporary shut-down of governmental web services in Tallinn, or to interfere with 
communications systems in Georgia in coordination with the invasion. Additionally, NATO 
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texts from 2009 explicitly emphasizes the difference between cyber piracy, and cyber security 
– all though they are inextricably linked. 
 
2010: 
 Agreement to enhance cyber defence capabilities [1] 
 Transnational-challenges in 2010; proliferation, terrorism, maritime, cyber, and 
energy security [1] [2] [3] 
 Cyber threats increasingly sophisticated [1] 
 Cyber-attacks [1] 
 Detecting, assessing, preventing, defending, and recovery of cyber-attacks on critical 
systems [1] [2] [3] 
 Centralized cyber protection (NCIRC) [1] 
 Assisting and developing allies’ capabilities [1] 
 Cooperation with United Nations and European Union [1] 
 Cyber defence policy development to be ready in 2011 [1] 
 Cyber defence [1] 
 Cyber-attacks on power grids, houses, cities [3] 
 Air traffic controls, shutting down banking services [2] [3] 
 Coordinated attacks to cripple key infrastructure [1] [2] 
 Cyber warfare recognized at permanent aspect of low-level warfare [1] 
 Missile defence, energy security, and cyber defence as NATO’s new dimensions [1] 
 Cyber cannot be put on the back-burner, must have priority [1] 
2010 saw a great increase in projecting understanding about cyberspace, warfare, and security. 
The complexity of cyber is accentuated by connecting trans-national challenges of proliferation, 
terrorism, maritime, cyber, and energy security. Furthermore, the importance of breaking down 
understanding of cyber defence as a mechanism to both detect, assess, prevent, defend, and 
recover from cyber-attacks to critical infrastructures. An acknowledgement of an increasing 
sophistication in the style of attacks, and the urging need to cooperate both within the alliance, 
as well as with both the European Union and the United Nations takes prominence. 
Additionally, the concept of defending critical infrastructure develops into accounting for 
power grids, houses, cities, air traffic  controls, banking services etc., and the urgent need of 
establishing better practices in public-private cooperation in cyber security. 
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2011: 
- Cyber defence [1] 
- Shared research and development between NATO members necessary to overcome 
challenges [1] 
- Protecting critical infrastructure a shared and important goal [2] 
- Developing closer links with the private sector to bolster cyber security [1] [2] 
- Public-private partnerships [1] 
In 2011, the points from the previous two years were firmly re-stated. The need for (shared) 
research and development, with the purpose of protecting critical infrastructure both in the 
private and public sectors. 
2012: 
- A large increase in number and sophistication of attacks [1] 
- Cyber defence capabilities [1] 
- Defence measures of infrastructure [2] 
- Cooperation and collaboration central in tackling issues [1] 
- Lean on the expertise of the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence 
(CCDCOE) [1] 
- Cyber-crime is rampant [1] [2] 
- New, borderless threats face member nations [1] 
- Terrorism, piracy, cyber-crime [2] 
- A rapidly evolving security environment [1] 
2012 solidified the discourse of protecting critical infrastructure as a core responsibility of 
NATO’s defence alliance. This, again, is to be done through collaboration and cooperation both 
internally and externally. In a context where cyber-crime is rampant, and also linked with both 
terrorism and piracy, these new borderless threats face member nations in a rapidly evolving 
security environment.  
2013: 
- Cyber-crime with large economic costs [1] 
A simple re-stating of the economic costs that follow cyber-crime. 
2014: 
- Modernizing NATO’s forces [1] 
- Cyber defence and national defence [1] [2] 
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- Cyber-attacks likely to be more common, sophisticated, and potentially more damaging 
in the future [1] [3] 
- Cyber policy is centered around prevention, detection, resilience, recovery, and 
defence [1] [2] [3] 
- Defend NATO’s own ICT is a fundamental responsibility [1] 
- Cyber-attacks could trigger article 5 [1] [2] [3] 
- Enhance national networks that NATO relies on for core tasks of cooperation and 
defence [1] [2] 
- Integrate cyber component to NATO operations [1] [2] [3] 
- Cooperation with European Union and United Nations [1] 
- Must improve and increase training, exercise, and education of cyber [1] [2] 
The Wales summit declaration could prove to be a paradigm shift for NATO and cyber security. 
Not only are attacks portrayed as increasing in number and volatility, but the cyber policy is 
laid out as a confirmation of the 2010 specifics on how to prevent, detect, recover, defend, and 
build resilience. The most prominent change in NATO’s discourse of 2014, was the 
acknowledgement that cyber-attacks could trigger article 5. Furthermore, the idea of integrating 
a cyber-component to NATO operation would also characterize as a paradigm shift of how 
NATO conducts its operations. This development is grounded in the need to improve and 
increase training, exercise, and education of personnel in the dimension of cyber. 
2015: 
- Must develop response to cyber aggression [1] 
- Cyber is now part of all crises and conflicts [1] [2] [3] 
- Cyber can trigger article 5 [1] [2] [3] 
- Must improve cyber resilience [1] 
- Cyber as a complex and fast-moving issue [1] [3] 
- Cyber security requires a comprehensive approach [1] 
- Cyber and hybrid warfare is inextricably linked [1] [2] [3] 
- NATO must develop concrete cyber strategies [1] 
- NATO must adapt to the new security environment [1] [2] 
2015 was a ground-breaking year with regards to NATO’s discourse on cyber. There are three 
main facets of this: Firstly, “Cyber is now part of all crises and conflicts” speaks to not only the 
prominence of cyber, but also the need to integrate a conscious cyber policy to all aspects of 
NATO. Secondly, the notion that a cyber-attack can trigger article 5 has at this point become 
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recurring. In effect, this could have gross implications of how NATO prepares for, and responds 
to cyber-attacks. Lastly, for the first time in an official document, cyber and hybrid warfare are 
discussed as inextricably linked. With regards to the need to adapt to a new security 
environment, the concept of cyber has at this point in time reached a level of complexity and 
criticalness that NATO implicitly has to undergo some sort of re-structuring of the alliance’s 
ways to deal with this reality. 
2016: 
- NATO is looking to improve its resilience versus cyber and hybrid threats [1] [2] 
[3] 
- Cyber defence is in need of improvement [1]. 
The latest official statements resubmits the necessity of improving NATO’s resilience to deal 
with both cyber and hybrid threats. Furthermore, the secretary general urges the need for an 
improvement with regards to NATO’s cyber defence.  
 
Conceptualization over time: Output 
 
Paragraph Title Year 
Strengthen our capabilities to defend against 
cyber attacks. 
NATO Summit 
Declaration, Prague 
2002 
The real threats to our security, from regional 
instability to the proliferation of ballistic 
missile technology and nuclear, biological and 
chemical agents, to terrorism, to cyber-
warfare, to organised crime, do not recognise 
borders, and are faced by NATO Allies and 
Russia alike. Isolating or ignoring Russia 
would only hobble our response to those 
dangers. If we can develop common 
approaches to these challenges, if we can find 
a way to fulfil the Founding Act's vision of 
joint action against these threats, we will all 
benefit. Close practical and pragmatic 
NATO Speech, SecGen, 
Warsaw 
2002 
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cooperation between NATO and Russia could 
be as important a transformation for its good 
in the strategic environment as the events of 
September 11 were for evil. 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, you have demonstrated critical 
leadership in helping NATO and Allied 
militaries transform to meet the needs of the 
modern security environment. By playing 
pivotal roles in defining a ground-breaking 
military concept for the defence against 
terrorism, to focusing SHAPE on the threats 
from weapons of mass destruction or cyber 
attack, your tenure has indeed helped retool 
the Alliance for the future. 
NATO speech, North 
Atlantic Council 
2003 
Our scientists have pooled their efforts in areas 
such as explosives detection, the secure 
decommissioning of nuclear submarines, 
cyber-security, and the psychological and 
social causes, effects and responses to 
terrorism. We have tested and enhanced our 
capabilities to manage the consequences of 
terrorist attacks, with the large scale exercise 
that Russia hosted in Noginsk in 2002, and 
another planned in Kaliningrad this coming 
June. 
NATO keynote Address, 
NATO Russia Council, 
Norfolk 
2004 
There are also some areas of NATO-Russia 
cooperation which do not get the headlines 
regularly. Let me mention to you the first 
meeting of the NATO-Russia Council Science 
Committee to be held in St. Petersburg in a few 
weeks; where scientists from NATO countries 
and Russia will debate cooperation in such 
NATO News 
Conference, NATO-
Russia Council, Brussels 
2005 
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areas as explosive detection and the 
psychological and sociological consequences 
of terrorism and cyber security. 
First and foremost, it is not enough to agree on 
our analysis of this new 21st century world. 
We all know that it is a world of globalised 
threats that require a globalised response. We 
know that we have to anticipate threats 
emerging from anywhere: events in the 
world’s poorest and most under-developed 
societies can threaten the security of the 
world’s wealthiest. We know that we have to 
confront not single, easily identifiable threats 
but flows: that is to say terrorism allied to drug 
profits or cyber space ; or small arms allied to 
militias and to illicit diamond trading; or 
organised crime networks allied to nuclear 
proliferation. The new conventional wisdom is 
that we need to operate without self-imposed 
geographical restrictions; that we need armed 
forces able to create and maintain stability as 
much as to win wars; and that we will not 
succeed unless we have an integrated approach 
where military, diplomatic and economic 
means combine to produce maximum effect 
NATO Keynote Speech, 
Riga 
2006 
Work to develop a NATO Network Enabled 
Capability to share information, data and 
intelligence reliably, securely and without 
delay in Alliance operations, while improving 
protection of our key information systems 
against cyber attack. 
Riga Summit Declaration  2006 
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The range of threats has also expanded, from 
classic military challenges to new ones. Peter 
mentioned cyber-attacks. He was right to. 
Estonia put up a stout and skilled defence of 
its IT infrastructure, and weathered the storm. 
I’m not sure every NATO country could 
defend itself so well. 
NATO Speech, London 2007 
Cyber attacks can take out a power grid, a 
banking system, and government services. 
While the attacks take place in cyber-space, 
the effects are very real. And while they are 
not military in the traditional sense, they have 
a clear security dimension, along with -- and 
linked to -- their economic impact 
NATO Speech, London 2007 
I also mentioned cyber defence. In 2004, 
NATO set up a centre focused precisely on 
cyber defence. When Estonia was hit by cyber 
attacks, that NATO centre sent personnel to 
help. As the military has had years of learning 
how to protect IT infrastructure, and because 
there is clearly an advantage to sharing best 
practices, I believe you will see more of a role 
for NATO in this area as well. 
NATO Speech, London 2007 
Second, the growing power of non-state 
actors. Globalisation brings incredible 
opportunities, yet it also has its dark spots. One 
is that it empowers fanatical individuals, by 
giving them access to enormously destructive 
means. I am not thinking of a nuclear “9/11”, 
but a terrorist attack with a radiological 
weapon certainly can no longer be considered 
“science fiction”. And last year’s cyber attack 
against Estonia demonstrated that an attack 
NATO Speech, Brussels 2008 
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against another country does not necessarily 
have to entail the use of military force. For 
non-state actors in particular, there are other 
options available 
Second, in addition to making sure that we can 
meet operational requirements, we also need 
to move forward on missile defence, cyber 
defence, and energy security. Regarding 
missile defence, our recent Bucharest Summit 
has provided us with a clear roadmap for the 
future. We agreed that the proliferation of 
missiles is a growing threat and that the US 
defence system should be an integral part of 
any future NATO?wide architecture. Based on 
this, we are now examining options for a 
comprehensive missile defence architecture, 
to be reviewed at our next Summit in 2009. 
Regarding cyber defence, we not only have a 
Cyber Policy in place now, but we have also 
created a Centre of Excellence, fittingly 
located in Estonia’s capital, Tallinn. 
NATO Speech, Brussels 2008 
NATO remains committed to strengthening 
key Alliance information systems against 
cyber attacks. We have recently adopted a 
Policy on Cyber Defence, and are developing 
the structures and authorities to carry it out. 
Our Policy on Cyber Defence emphasises the 
need for NATO and nations to protect key 
information systems in accordance with their 
respective responsibilities; share best 
practices; and provide a capability to assist 
Allied nations, upon request, to counter a 
cyber attack. We look forward to continuing 
Bucharest Summit 
Declaration 
2008 
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the development of NATO’s cyber defence 
capabilities and strengthening the linkages 
between NATO and national authorities 
Cyber security – our second topic today – is 
another case in point. Government and private 
companies launch cyber-attacks. 
Governments and industry suffer the 
consequences, in terms of lost revenue, lost 
data and lost services. And it will take 
cooperation between the public and private 
sectors to build real defences. 
NATO Speech, London 2009 
We also want to do better at cyber defence. 
NATO’s Cyber Defence Centre is a good 
step in the right direction. But the sustained, 
directed cyber attacks Estonia suffered a 
couple of years ago shows that the problem is 
much bigger than that. On both subjects, I’m 
very much looking forward to the discussions 
today. But there is a fundamental difference 
between, one the one hand, piracy and 
cybersecurity, and climate change on the 
other. In the first two cases, the threat is very 
clear. We know what a pirate looks like – and 
no, I’m not thinking of someone with an eye 
patch and parrot on his shoulder. I’m thinking 
of someone well armed and ruthless. The 
kidnapping and ransom is taking place now. 
The costs to industry and Governments are 
easily calculated. And while implementing 
them might be difficult, we have a pretty good 
idea of what the right solutions might be. 
NATO Speech, London 2009 
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The same is true of cyber defence. Attacks on 
industry and government websites and 
information systems are already a daily 
occurrence. Again, the costs are pretty easy to 
calculate. And while we are certainly able to 
do better, we have a general idea of the steps 
we should take. The challenge is figuring out 
how to do it. 
NATO Speech, London 2009 
Agreed to enhance our cyber defence 
capabilities; agreed 
Lisbon Summit 
Declaration 
2010 
Partnerships enhance Euro-Atlantic and wider 
international security and stability; can 
provide frameworks for political dialogue and 
regional cooperation in the field of security 
and defence; contribute to strengthening our 
common values; and are issued by the Heads 
of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
essential to the success of many of our 
operations and missions. They enable us to 
share expertise; support broader reform; 
promote transparency, accountability and 
integrity in the defence sector; train and assist 
our partners in developing their own 
capabilities; and prepare interested nations for 
membership in NATO. They are also 
important in addressing emerging, and 
continuing, trans-national challenges such as 
proliferation, terrorism, maritime-, cyber- and 
energy security. 
Lisbon Summit 
Declaration 
2010 
Cyber threats are rapidly increasing and 
evolving in sophistication. In order to ensure 
NATO’s permanent and unfettered access to 
Lisbon Summit 
Declaration 
2010 
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cyberspace and integrity of its critical systems, 
we will take into account the cyber dimension 
of modern conficts in NATO’s doctrine and 
improve its capabilities to detect, assess, 
prevent, defend and recover in case of a cyber 
attack against systems of critical importance 
to the Alliance. We will strive in particular to 
accelerate NATO Computer Incident 
Response Capability (NCIRC) to Full 
Operational Capability (FOC) by 2012 and the 
bringing of all NATO bodies under centralised 
cyber protection. We will use NATO’s 
defence planning processes in order to 
promote the development of Allies’ cyber 
defence capabilities, to assist individual 
Allies upon request, and to optimise 
information sharing, collaboration and 
interoperability. To address the security risks 
emanating from cyberspace, we will work 
closely with other actors, such as the UN and 
the EU, as agreed. We have tasked the Council 
to develop, drawing notably on existing 
international structures and on the basis of a 
review of our current policy, a NATO in-depth 
cyber defence policy by June 2011 and to 
prepare an action plan for its implementation. 
Face current, evolving and emerging 
challenges – including through expanding the 
current theatre missile defence programme, 
and defending against cyber attacks. 
Lisbon Summit 
Declaration 
2010 
So let us look beyond Afghanistan. Let us look 
at some of the other security challenges that 
we will have to confront – challenges where 
NATO Speech, Bucharest 2010 
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acting now is paramount: coping with 
proliferation, energy security, and cyber 
defence. 
My third example is cyber defence. Nowhere 
is the need to act today rather than tomorrow 
more evident than in this area. A well 
orchestrated cyber attack can turn off the 
power in your house, your city, your country. 
It can shut down air traffic control. It can shut 
down banks. In short, a cyber attack can bring 
a country down without a single soldier having 
to cross its borders. This is not science fiction. 
It is the real world. Three years ago, our Ally 
Estonia suffered a coordinated cyber attack 
that temporarily crippled key governmental, 
financial and media services. Several other 
NATO and partner nations have experienced 
similar attacks, although without suffering the 
same degree of disruption. So it is no 
exaggeration to state that cyber attacks have 
become a new form of permanent, low-level 
warfare. Our NATO Headquarters, for 
example, suffers over 100 attacks per day.  
NATO Speech, Bucharest 2010 
Above all, we set up the NATO Centre of 
Excellence on cyber defence in Estonia. So 
we now have a focal point for developing 
practical action programmes and for sharing 
lessons learned and best practice – both among 
Allies and with partners.  
NATO speech, Bucharest 2010 
 
 
Missile defence, energy security and cyber 
defence are new dimensions for NATO. And 
NATO Speech, Bucharest 2010 
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we have to address them while other pressing 
tasks – notably our Afghanistan mission – call 
for our political attention and our financial 
resources. This will inevitably raise questions 
about the proper balance between the various 
tasks of NATO. 
I am not going to prejudge the new Strategic 
Concept. But I’ll make one point very clear: 
We cannot afford to put missile defence, 
energy security or cyber defence on the back 
burner. Because new challenges don’t wait 
until we feel ready to meet them. It is our job 
– indeed, our duty – to prepare ourselves. We 
need to look ahead. To prevent unwelcome 
developments, or to mitigate their 
consequences 
NATO Speech, Bucharest 2010 
But pooling is not enough, if we don’t put our 
money where the real priorities are. At the 
NATO Summit in Lisbon last November, we 
identified several of these priorities, including 
cyber defence, and the fight against terrorism 
and piracy. We also agreed on ten critical 
capabilities for our forces – such as helicopter 
transport, medical support, and countering 
road-side bombs. 
NATO Speech, Munich 2011 
So even big European nations have difficulty 
in keeping the edge, for example on drone 
technology. At a time when challenges are 
global, 80 per cent of European Research and 
Development continues to be spent on national 
programmes. We need to do better. If nations 
devote a greater share of their Research and  
development spending to multinational 
NATO Speech, Munich 2011 
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projects, that will make a difference. For 
example, smaller nations who can’t 
necessarily develop their own responses to 
cyber threats could join together. NATO can 
help and advise them on how to protect their 
critical information infrastructures. 
To prepare for the future, let us also build 
closer links with the private sector – and I am 
pleased to see several representatives from 
industry at our meeting today. In the past, 
military Research and Development put 
defence at the cutting edge of technology, with 
the civilian sector eventually taking advantage 
of those innovations. Now, in many areas, the 
situation has reversed. Industry has a wealth of 
expertise, including on cyber defence, fuel 
cell energy and light logistics. We must find 
better ways through public-private 
partnerships to explore the military potential 
of emerging technologies, and to involve 
industry sooner and more closely. 
NATO Speech, Munich 2011 
Cyber attacks continue to increase 
significantly in number and evolve in 
sophistication and complexity.  We reaffirm 
the cyber defence commitments made at the 
Lisbon Summit.  Following Lisbon, last year 
we adopted a Cyber Defence Concept, 
Policy, and Action Plan, which are now being 
implemented.  Building on NATO’s existing 
capabilities, the critical elements of the NATO 
Computer Incident Response Capability 
(NCIRC) Full Operational Capability (FOC), 
including protection of most sites and users, 
Chicago Summit 
Declaration 
2012 
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will be in place by the end of 2012.  We have 
committed to provide the resources 
and complete the necessary reforms to bring 
all NATO bodies under centralised cyber 
protection, to ensure that enhanced cyber 
defence capabilities protect our collective 
investment in NATO.  We will further 
integrate cyber defence measures 
into Alliance structures and procedures and, as 
individual nations, we remain committed to 
identifying and delivering national cyber 
defence capabilities that strengthen Alliance 
collaboration and interoperability, including 
through NATO defence planning 
processes.  We will develop further our ability 
to prevent, detect, defend against, and recover 
from cyber attacks.  To address the cyber 
security threats and to improve our common 
security, we are committed to engage with 
relevant partner nations on a case-by-case 
basis and with international organisations, 
inter alia the EU, as agreed, the Council of 
Europe, the UN and the OSCE, in order to 
increase concrete cooperation.  We will also 
take full advantage of the expertise offered by 
the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence in Estonia 
Over the past few decades, NATO has adapted 
to the new, global security challenges of the 
21st century – terrorism, failing states, 
proliferation and cyber crime. The Alliance 
has turned into a very flexible security 
instrument -- an instrument at the service of 
NATO Speech, Jordan 2012 
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our own 28 member nations, but also, and 
increasingly, at the service of the wider 
international community as well. 
Risks and threats like terrorism, proliferation, 
piracy and cyber crime know no borders – and 
they tend to reinforce each other too. To meet 
these challenges and to defeat them will 
require a new level of international 
consultation and cooperation. 
NATO Speech, Jordan 2012 
 
Threats like terrorism, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, and cyber 
warfare know no borders. Instability halfway 
around the world can have a direct impact on 
our security at home. Today, territorial 
defence and security demand a global 
perspective. 
NATO Speech, Zurich 2012 
Recently, Switzerland has expressed an 
interest in broadening its political dialogue 
and practical cooperation with NATO to 
include issues such as cyber-security and 
countering proliferation. We welcome this 
interest. And look forward to working more 
closely with you on these issues in the future. 
They are a further demonstration of your 
country’s understanding of our evolving 
security environment, and the merits of your 
partnership with NATO. 
NATO Speech, Zurich 2012 
Europol, the European Union’s law-
enforcement agency, puts the annual value of 
corporations’ losses from criminal cyber 
activity at one trillion US dollars. 
NATO Speech, 
Dubrovnik 
2013 
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NATO needs, now more than ever, modern, 
robust, and capable forces at high readiness, in 
the air, on land and at sea, in order to meet 
current and future challenges. We are 
committed to further enhancing our 
capabilities. To this end, today we have agreed 
a Defence Planning Package with a number of 
priorities, such as enhancing and reinforcing 
training and exercises; command and control, 
including for demanding air operations; 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; 
NATO's ballistic missile defence capability, in 
accordance with the decisions taken at the 
2010 Lisbon and 2012 Chicago Summits, 
including the voluntary nature of national 
contributions; cyber defence; as well as 
improving the robustness and readiness of our 
land forces for both collective defence and 
crisis response. Fulfilment of these priorities 
will increase the Alliance's collective 
capabilities and better prepare NATO to 
address current and future threats and 
challenges. We have agreed this Package in 
order to inform our defence investments and to 
improve the capabilities that Allies have in 
national inventories. In this context, NATO 
joint air power capabilities require longer-term 
consideration 
Wales Summit 
Declaration 
2014 
As the Alliance looks to the future, cyber 
threats and attacks will continue to become 
more common, sophisticated, and potentially 
damaging. To face this evolving challenge, we 
have endorsed an Enhanced Cyber Defence 
Wales Summit 
Declaration 
2014 
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Policy, contributing to the fulfillment of the 
Alliance's core tasks. The policy reaffirms the 
principles of the indivisibility of Allied 
security and of prevention, detection, 
resilience, recovery, and defence. It recalls 
that the fundamental cyber defence 
responsibility of NATO is to defend its own 
networks, and that assistance to Allies should 
be addressed in accordance with the spirit of 
solidarity, emphasizing the responsibility of 
Allies to develop the relevant capabilities for 
the protection of national networks. Our policy 
also recognises that international law, 
including international humanitarian law and 
the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace. Cyber 
attacks can reach a threshold that threatens 
national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, 
security, and stability. Their impact could be 
as harmful to modern societies as a 
conventional attack. We affirm therefore that 
cyber defence is part of NATO's core task of 
collective defence. A decision as to when a 
cyber attack would lead to the invocation of 
Article 5 would be taken by the North 
Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis 
We are committed to developing further our 
national cyber defence capabilities, and we 
will enhance the cyber security of national 
networks upon which NATO depends for 
its core tasks, in order to help make the 
Alliance resilient and fully protected. Close 
bilateral and multinational cooperation plays a 
key role in enhancing the cyber defence 
Wales Summit 
Declaration 
2014 
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capabilities of the Alliance. We will continue 
to integrate cyber defence into NATO 
operations and operational and contingency 
planning, and enhance information sharing 
and situational awareness among Allies. 
Strong partnerships play a key role in 
addressing cyber threats and risks. We will 
therefore continue to engage actively on cyber 
issues with relevant partner nations on a case-
by-case basis and with other international 
organisations, including the EU, as agreed, 
and will intensify our cooperation with 
industry through a NATO Industry Cyber 
Partnership. Technological innovations and 
expertise from the private sector are crucial to 
enable NATO and Allies to achieve the 
Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy's objectives. 
We will improve the level of NATO's cyber 
defence education, training, and exercise 
activities. We will develop the NATO cyber 
range capability, building, as a first step, on 
the Estonian cyber range capability, while 
taking into consideration the capabilities and 
requirements of the NATO CIS School and 
other NATO training and education bodies 
In a crisis, the first responder will be the nation 
that is targeted.  But NATO  must be there to 
support any national efforts. This is a matter of 
planning and of political will; and making sure 
that we complement and reinforce each 
other.  We need to be able to deal with 
complex evolving hybrid situations, including 
cyber-aggression 
NATO Keynote Speech, 
Washington 
2015 
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Cyber is now a central part of virtually all 
crises and conflicts.  NATO has made it clear 
that cyber-attacks can potentially trigger an 
Article 5 response.  We need to detect and 
counter cyber-attacks early; improve our 
resilience; and be able to recover quickly. A 
more active cyber policy should be a focus as 
we plan for Warsaw.  Cyber defence is just 
one of the capabilities we need in order to deal 
with the changed security environment... 
which brings me to my second point: how do 
we keep our edge? 
NATO Keynote Speech, 
Washington 
2015 
 
But once it's done, it sends a very power 
signal:  28 Allies acting as one. The issues we 
are facing are complex and fast-
moving.  Cyber-attacks happen in 
seconds.  Missiles reach their targets in 
minutes.  Little green men can move within 
hours.  So we must also be able to move fast. 
NATO Keynote Speech, 
Washington 
2015 
But then, as I underlined, we have to have a 
comprehensive approach and to increase the 
resilience of our societies.  Cyber is 
extremely important as part of the strategy 
which we are developing against hybrid 
warfare; but also working with partners, for 
instance the European Union to improve 
governance; to increase the general resilience 
of countries; and therefore, also, reduce the 
vulnerability towards hybrid warfare. 
NATO Keynote Speech, 
Washington 
2015 
I foresee that by Warsaw we have both 
implemented on the measures which we have 
already agreed on.  But in addition we should 
NATO Keynote Speech, 
Washington 
2015 
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have developed more concrete strategies and 
plans when it comes to, for instance, as I 
mentioned, cyber, decision-making and, of 
course, some of the elements which is now on 
the drawing board like a sea component and 
the naval component and the air component of 
the Spearhead Force.  So there are many 
elements, some are quite clear already; some 
we have to develop.  But the thing is that we 
are just in the beginning of a big 
transformation, a big adaptation of NATO 
facing a new security environment. 
We will enhance our resilience against hybrid 
warfare and cyber threats. And make sure 
that the nuclear component of our deterrence 
posture remains credible and effective. 
NATO Speech, 
Washington 
2016 
We are also exploring what more we can do in 
areas such as counter-terrorism, energy and 
maritime security, and cyber defence. My aim 
is to bring forward our cooperation with the 
GCC at the Warsaw Summit in July. 
NATO Speech, 
Washington 
2016 
 
 
